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WHO REACTS TO INCOME TAX RATE CHANGES?  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME TAXES AND THE 
MOTIVATION TO WORK: THE CASE OF AZERBAIJAN 
Orkhan Nadirov, Bruce Dehning, Khatai Aliyev, Minura Iskandarova 
Abstract: This research investigates the effects of income taxation on the motivation to work 
by employing a survey method for the Azerbaijan population. The two research questions  
of interest are, if subjects consider income taxes when deciding how many hours to work 
and how subjects would react to a hypothetical 5% income tax rate increase. Also examined 
are the responses to these questions between subjects with different socio-economic 
characteristics. Examining cross-sectional data of 326 respondents reveals that income 
taxes do not influence Azerbaijan labour market participants’ motivation to work, 
regardless of their socio-economic characteristics. Empirical results indicate that reactions 
to hypothetical income tax rate increases show that the strength of response differs 
significantly across gender, age, marital status, field of employment, and income level. 
However, there are no significant results for differences in gender and after-tax wages. Our 
study contributes to the labour supply literature with the theory that after an income tax is 
imposed, both the average price and the average utility of leisure is greater for high wage 
earners than low wage earners. 
The document can be downloaded at http://hdl.handle.net/10195/67936. 
Keywords: Income taxes, Motivation to work, Survey design, OLS method, Azerbaijan. 
JEL Classification: H24, J22. 
Introduction 
Most economists have accepted the notion that high income tax rates severely reduce the 
motivation to work for many years. Prior studies on the subject of income taxes and the 
motivation to work have been predominantly theoretical (Pigou,1929). According to the 
early hypothesis of Knight (1921), the motivation to work increases after direct income 
taxes are imposed or increased, in order to overcome the decline in after-tax income. 
However, Robbins (1997) and Cooper (1952) expand the theoretical formulation of this 
problem and assert that it is not possible, a priori, to measure the effect of a direct income 
tax on leisure and the motivation to work. They suggest that a direct income tax might have 
negative, positive or no effect on the work-leisure relationship and empirical measurements 
are needed to predict each direction. These formal treatments refer to the choice between 
leisure and income when they test the effect of income taxes on the motivation to work 
(Wald, 1945; Black, 1965; Henderson, 1948). But Rolph and Break (1961) touched upon  
a more comprehensive review of the theoretical reasoning related to income taxes and the 
motivation to work. Theory that stems from the neoclassical economic perspective defines 
the two ways in which income taxes may affect the motivation to work, the income effect 
and the substitution effect. The substitution effect is the decision a labourer makes when 
considering the price of an hour of leisure. The income effect is the decision a labourer 
makes when considering the number of hours of work required to maintain their level  
of income. 
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In prior studies, economists refer to the price of leisure because they are considering the 
price to be the opportunity cost of leisure compared to the alternative of working.  
For instance, Goode (1949), Rolfe and Furness (1957), Break (1957), Musgrave (1959), 
Rolph and Break (1961), Fields and Stanbury (1971) and Robbins (1997) stated in their 
studies that the imposition of an income tax or increase in the tax rate is equal to a drop  
in the price of leisure. The income effect is straightforward, which moves people to do extra 
work to bring back their preceding level of disposable income. Income taxes make people 
feel poorer and leisure is a normal good, which means that workers prefer to consume less 
of it when they are poorer. But the substitution effect has an opposite effect that moves 
people to do less work because of a decline in the price of leisure. As a result, people feel 
compelled to take more time off since it will cost them less in forgone income. On the other 
hand, the income effect is less clear and its effect depends on government services 
producing a form of income for them. If the government services are satisfactory  
for taxpayers, then the income effect of income taxes is reduced and vice versa. If it is not 
satisfactory for taxpayers, their net wage would be reduced and taxes will have an income 
effect. For this reason, the substitution effect becomes comparatively more significant. 
Moreover, the impact of income taxes on the motivation to work cannot be defined  
by theorizing alone, because theory cannot explain the net effect of income taxes on the 
motivation to work. In one direction, the motivation to work is reduced if the substitution 
effect dominates income effect. In the other direction, the motivation to work is increased  
if the income effect is larger than the substitution effect. Which effect is stronger is  
an empirical question that must be resolved by empirical analysis rather than theoretical 
analysis (Cooper, 1952).  
Various methodologies and different types of populations have been used in previous 
studies. For example, these include the study of 160 American business executives  
by Sander (1951), the survey of 1,429 British industrial workers carried out by the Prest 
(1956), the study of 1,000 German businessmen and professionals by Strümpel (1966)  
and a more sophisticated study of almost a thousand affluent Americans by Barlow et al. 
(1966). All of these studies have concluded that income taxes have minor disincentive 
effects on the motivation to work. In addition, Break (1957) attempted to measure the 
effects of high marginal rates of personal income taxes on the motivation to work  
of 306 British solicitors and accountants that are free to change their work incentives  
and are more informed about their marginal tax rates than most individuals are. In addition, 
he found that income taxes have little effect on the motivation to work. 
After Break’s study, Rolfe and Furness (1957), Chatterjee and Robinson (1969) tested 
the same relationship, but none of them found anything to contradict Break’s earlier results. 
Fields and Stanbury (1971) used the same systematic approach employed by Break (1957). 
Fields and Stanbury (1971) interviewed 285 British solicitors and accountants in their study. 
They provided results similar to Break (1957). The main problem with these survey studies 
(e.g. Break, 1957; Fields and Stanbury, 1971) is that they have relied primarily on middle-
class respondents. The study of 2000 weekly-paid workers by Brown and Levin (1974) was 
the first large survey that relied on responses from other socio-economic groups. They 
found that 74% of the men and 93% of the women stated that income taxes had no effect  
on the motivation to work. Afterwards, Brown et al. (1986) used simulation models based 
on very large-scale survey to estimate the effects of various tax changes on the motivation  
to work.  They found that most individual’s motivation to work is unresponsive  
to tax changes. 
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Calderwood and Webley (1992) attempted to characterise the respondents whose 
motivation to work is responsive to taxes. They showed that income taxation is not salient 
for the most people in the UK. They stated that 31 persons out of 74 would work more if the 
tax rate increased, but the rest would work the same or less. However, their study was 
limited only to the employed persons. There is a notion that gender influences change  
in motivation to work due to tax rate changes. The argument is that men increase  
and women decrease their motivation to work when there is an increase in the income tax 
rate (Leuthold, 1983; James, 1992). More recent studies such as Eissa et al. (2008), Meghir 
and Phillips (2010), Keane (2011), and Saez et al. (2012) analyse differences in men  
and women’s motivation to work. Their findings are similar to the results of previous 
studies that taxes increases men’s motivation to work, but women’s motivation to work is 
decreased by the prospect of their earnings being taxed. On the other hand, Manski (2014) 
concludes that we really do not know how the motivation to work responds to income tax 
rates. As a result, little is known about the effect of income taxes on all class respondents 
such as low, middle and high-income earners, and our study tries to go some way towards 
dealing with this ambiguity. However, elementary economic theory (substitution  
and income effects) might not apply in real life, because in reality income tax rates for low 
wage earners do not change, while high wage earners are affected. Contrary to prior 
economic-psychology approaches, our unique theory is the combination of the price  
of an hour of leisure, and also the utility of an hour of leisure, assuming it is higher for the 
high wage earners than the low wage earners (on average). 
1 Method 
1.1 Subjects and Procedure 
Our target population was employed and unemployed persons in Azerbaijan. The survey 
was conducted in the form of online questionnaires between 1 July and 1 October 2016.  
The questionnaires were mailed to 1,330 people that were randomly selected with regard  
to gender, age, and their respective region of residence. There were 326 responses to the 
questionnaires, a response rate of 24.5%. However, 19 questionnaires were not useable, 
resulting in 23% final response rate. The age of participants ranges from 18-65 with a mean 
of 28.9 years (std dev = 7.67). Approximately 42% of the sample is female. The majority  
of subjects have an after-tax wage of below 500 AZN per month (52%) compared  
to participants in higher income categories (500-1000 AZN: 33%; above 1000 AZN: 15%). 
1.2 Questionnaire, data description and analysis 
The questionnaire was divided into three parts: (1) perception of income taxes,  
(2) reactions to tax rate changes and (3) socio-demographic characteristics. The first section 
investigates whether income taxes affect the respondent’s motivation to work by using the 
approach of Hayo and Uhl (2015). Subjects were asked, “Does the tax burden usually matter 
when you determine extent and intensity of your work activities?”. Based on the responses, 
the dummy variable Tax_problem was coded 1 if income taxes affect the subject’s 
motivation to work and 0 if income taxes do not affect the subject’s motivation to work. 
The second section involves a measure based on Calderwood and Webley (1992)  
to assess people’s reactions to hypothetical tax rate changes. In our analysis, Tax_react 
captures the responses of the survey participants to a 5% hypothetical increase in the income 
tax rate. Subjects were asked, “Suppose, it is announced tomorrow that income tax rates 
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increased by 5%”. Its value varies between 0 for subjects strongly reducing the amount  
of work to 5 for subjects strongly increasing the amount that they work. 
Responses from the final demographics section on socio-economic characteristics were 
captured in the following variables and employed in the empirical analysis: 
- Female is a dummy variable to measure the differences due to gender status; Female 
equals 1 if the participant is female, and 0 otherwise. 
- Age is the participant’s age in years, and is included in the analysis to test the effects  
of age on the research questions. 
- Married is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant is married, otherwise 0. 
- Fiancé is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant is engaged to be married, 
otherwise 0.  
- Single is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent is not engaged and is not 
married or has not been married, and 0 otherwise. This variable is used as a base group 
to examine the response differences due to marital status. 
- Academic is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant works in a position  
of mostly academic related activity, otherwise 0. 
- Other_prof is a dummy variable that equals 1 for subjects working in positions outside 
of academia that require professional skills, otherwise 0. 
- Ins_empl is a dummy variable that equals 1 for those who are not employed in positions 
that require professional skills, otherwise 0. This variable is used as a base group  
to examine the response differences due to field of employment. 
- Unemp is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the subject is unemployed, otherwise 0. 
- High_income is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the after-tax income of the 
corresponding candidate is more than 1000 AZN per month, otherwise 0. 
- Middle_income is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the after-tax income of the 
participant is 500-1000 AZN per month, otherwise 0.  
- Low_income is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the after-tax income of the respondent 
is less than 500 AZN per month, otherwise 0. This variable is employed as a base group 
to examine the response differences due to income. 
SPSS analytical tools were employed in all empirical tests. Multivariate regression 
analysis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as well as Binary Logit and Binary Probit 
estimation was used on cross-sectional data for robustness checks. The econometric models 
are estimated with different dependent variables but the same combination of independent 
variables. The models can be specified mathematically as follows: 
i
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Here, δ  and γ  represent regression coefficients, i denotes the i
th
 observation, iν  and iυ  are 
error terms. 
2 Results 
2.1 Descriptive statistics 
The empirical findings are presented according to the two research questions. The first 
one addresses if taxes affect subjects’ motivation to work. The second one addresses a 5% 
hypothetical income tax rate increase and whether it affects subjects’ motivation to work. 
The survey results show that 65.4% of respondents do not consider taxes when making their 
working decisions, while 34.6% do (see Table 1). There were 306 useable responses to this 
question. These results confirm previous literature that finds that income taxes have only 
minor disincentive effects on the motivation to work (Sander, 1951; Prest, 1956; Strümpel, 
1966; Barlow et al., 1966; Break, 1957; Rolfe and Furness, 1957; Chatterjee and Robinson, 
1969; Fields and Stanbury, 1971; Brown and Levin, 1974; Brown et al., 1986; Hayo  
and Uhl, 2015). 
Tab. 1: Do taxes have any influence on your working decisions? Whole sample group 
analysis. 
 Frequency Percent Standard error Conf. interval 
No 200 65.4 2.7 [60.9, 69.9] 
Yes 106 34.6 2.7 [30.1, 39.1] 
Total 306 100 - - 
Source: Authors’ own compilation 
Meanwhile, 308 survey participants provided their reaction to a hypothetical 5% increase  
in income tax rates. Table 2 presents the overall response degree statistics (from strongly 
reduce labour supply to strongly increase labour supply). 
Tab. 2: What would your reaction be to a 5% income tax rate increase? 
Whole sample group analysis. 
 Frequency Percent Standard error Conf. interval 
Strongly reduce labour supply 12 3.9 1.1 [2.1, 5.7] 
Reduce labour supply 29 9.4 1.7 [6.7, 12.1] 
Unchanged 178 57.8 2.8 [53.2, 62.4] 
Increase labour supply 34 11.0 1.8 [8.1, 13.9] 
Highly increase labour supply 40 13.0 1.9 [9.9, 16.2] 
Strongly increase labour supply 15 4.9 1.2 [2.9, 6.9] 
Total 308 100 - - 
Source: Authors’ own compilation 
Both Table 1 and Table 2 imply the same conclusion for the overall group; Azerbaijan 
labour market participant are not very sensitive to taxes. The majority of the participants do 
not consider taxes when deciding how much to work. This is supported by Table 2,  
as 57.8% of the sample responded that their motivation to work would not change if income 
taxes increased by 5%. Our results provide very strong support for the hypothetical situation 
of Calderwood and Webley (1992). This result, however, is for all subjects and the 
responsiveness may differ across socio-economic characteristics. Demographic information 
was collected to test the research questions across different socio-economic characteristics 
of the respondents. Table 3 tabulates overall descriptive outputs. 
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Tab. 3: Do taxes have any influence on your working decisions? Socio-economic 
categorical analysis. 
 Yes No 
According to gender 
Male 32.6% 67.4% 
Female 38.1% 61.9% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) = 0.321 
According to marital status 
Married 32.3% 67.7% 
Fiancé 36.8% 63.2% 
Single 36.8% 63.2% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) = 0.715 
According to after-tax wage category 
High income 33.3% 66.7% 
Middle income 37.6% 62.4% 
Low income 33.8% 66.2% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) = 0.803 
According to employment field 
Academic 37.5% 62.5% 
Other professional 31.0% 69.0% 
Insignificantly employed 32.1% 67.9% 
Unemployed 36.5% 63.5% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value)  = 0.817 
Source: Authors’ own compilation 
Similarly, proportional distribution to the primary research questions across groups with 
different socio-economic characteristics confirms the unresponsiveness of workers to taxes 
in Azerbaijan. The majority of responses are ‘No’ irrespective of gender, marital status, 
income level, or industry. This implies that taxes are not part of decision making  
for working purposes. It is interesting that across all socio-economic categories, 
approximately the same proportion of participants do not consider taxes when deciding how 
much to work. Only around 31-37.5% consider taxes when making decision on how much 
to work. Pearson Chi-Square p-values are also highly revealing. In all cases the value is 
greater than 0.05, which means that there are no significant differences between the 
specified groups within each category. 
How a 5% hypothetical income tax rate increase affects the motivation to work  
of Azerbaijan labour force participants with different socio-economic characteristics is 
tabulated in Table 4. 
Tab. 4: What would your reaction be to a 5% income tax rate increase? 
Socio-economic categorical analysis. 
 Reduce labour supply Unchanged Increase labour supply 
According to gender 
Male 12.9% 57.3% 29.8% 
Female 14.0% 58.9% 27.1% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value)= 0.871 
According to marital status 
Married 9.6% 65.2% 25.2% 
Fiancé 5.3% 42.1% 52.6% 
Single 17.1% 53.9% 28.9% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value)= 0.029 
According to after-tax wage category 
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High income 9.3% 76.7% 14.0% 
Middle income 15.8% 57.9% 26.3% 
Low income 13.2% 52.6% 34.2% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) = 0.520 
According to employment field 
Academic 10.0% 62.0% 28.0% 
Other professional 7.0% 58.1% 34.9% 
Insignificantly employed 21.5% 62.0% 16.5% 
Unemployed 13.5% 47.3% 39.2% 
Pearson Chi-Square (p-value)= 0.011 
Source: Authors’ own compilation  
The response to a 5% hypothetical tax rate increase does not differ significantly between 
genders (Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) > 0.05). For both genders, more than half of the 
respondents say that the increase will not affect how much they work. 12.9% of males said 
that the increase would reduce the amount that they work, while 29.8% said they would 
work more, with the remainder responding that there would be no change in the number  
of hours worked. 14% of females said that the increase would reduce the amount that they 
work, while 27.1% said they would work more, with the remainder responding that there 
would be no change in the number of hours worked. 
The impact of a hypothetical 5% income tax rate increase is significantly different 
depending on the subject’s marital status (Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) < 0.05). This is 
particularly true for respondents engaged to be married.  Fiancé was the only sub-category 
where a majority of the respondents said they would increase the number of hours worked  
if taxes increased. The majority of married and single subjects said that there would not be 
any significant impact. 
There was no significant difference in responses for subjects in different income 
categories (Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) > 0.05). Nevertheless, there is a trend in the 
results. As after-tax income level falls, the share of participants who claim that their labour 
supply will not change decreases, while the share of responses in favour of more labour 
supply increases. 
Across employment field, there were significant differences in the response to  
a hypothetical 5% tax rate increase (Pearson Chi-Square (p-value) > 0.05). However, it is 
very difficult to interpret the differences by examining the proportions. It appears as though 
more professionals, working either in or outside of academia, will reduce their output less 
than non-professionals, while non-professionals are less likely to increase their labour 
supply.  For all three groups the majority of respondents would work the same regardless  
of the tax rate increase. Additional empirical analysis might clarify some of these results. 
2.2 Empirical Results 
Estimation outputs for equation (1) and (2) are presented in Table 5 below. There are no 
statistically significant coefficients for equation (1), which supports the statistical analysis 
shown previously in Table 1 and Table 3. Such output is straightforward and plausible. 
Income taxes do not impact the motivation to work of people in the Azerbaijan labour 
market. This is true across different socio-economic characteristics. 
Before interpreting estimation results, it is noteworthy to mention that residuals for both 
models are tested for heteroscedasticity by employing ARCH and White tests, 
autocorrelation by using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, and functional 
misspecification problem with Ramsey-Reset test. Moreover, the Jarque-Bera test is applied 
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to examine normality in the distribution of residuals. Test results show no  
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, or functional misspecification in equation (1) nor  
in equation (2) (.> 0.10). In equation (2), test output indicates a normal distribution  
of residuals (.> 0.10). For equation (1), the value of the Jarque-Bera test result is fairly 
high (JBN= 39.13645), which means rejection of the null hypothesis 
(: 	
		
				
) at 1% significance level (.< 0.01). However, 
normal distribution of residuals is not a serious problem in large samples. As the sample 
size in equation (1) is fairly large (250), this shortcoming can be ignored.  
Tab. 5: Empirical results 
Independent variables 
Tax_problem 
(equation 1) 
Tax_react 
(equation 2) 
 OLS Logit Probit  
Female 
0.0585 
(0.3702) 
0.2638 
(0.2898) 
0.1698 
(0.1777) 
-0.2560* 
(0.1471) 
Log(age) 
0.1161 
(0.4813) 
0.5287 
(0.7261) 
0.3258 
(0.4425) 
-0.9791 *** 
(0.3657) 
Married 
-0.0151 
(0.8563) 
-0.0696 
(0.3701) 
-0.0421 
(0.2264) 
0.2230 
(0.1859) 
Fiancé 
0.0616 
(0.6145) 
0.2797 
(0.5307) 
0.1728 
(0.3263) 
0.7172 ** 
(0.2767) 
Academic 
-0.0349 
(0.7140) 
-0.1527 
(0.4256) 
-0.0892 
(0.2599) 
0.2246 
(0.2138) 
Other_professional 
-0.0329 
(0.6527) 
-0.1474 
(0.3285) 
-0.0861 
(0.2008) 
0.4713 *** 
(0.1652) 
Unemployed  
0.1290 
(0.0696) 
0.5666 
(0.3085) 
0.3512 
(0.1904) 
-0.2229 
(0.1603) 
Middle_income 
0.0996 
(0.1707) 
0.4439 
(0.3197) 
0.2777 
(0.1962) 
-0.2154 
(0.1625) 
High_income 
0.0314 
(0.7485) 
0.1421 
(0.4398) 
0.0871 
(0.2679) 
-0.5063 ** 
(0.2213) 
C  
-0.1181 
(0.8230) 
-2.7592 
(2.3351) 
-1.7102 
(1.4227) 
5.5900 *** 
(1.1723) 
R2 0.0281 0.0217 0.0220 0.1181 
Included Obs. 250 250 250 251 
St. Error of regression 0.4780 0.4784 0.4784 1.0816 
Statistics and Residuals Diagnostics tests results 
Equation 1 (OLS) 
σ=0.477986; χ
SC
2 2= 0.589780 [0.5553]; χ
ARCH
2 4=1.517827 [0.2054];   
χ
HETR
2  = 0.821921 [0.7750]; JB
N
= 39.13645 [0.0000]; FFF= 1.177992 [0.3097] 
Equation 2 
σ=1.081646; χ
SC
2 2= 0.201762 [0.8174]; χ
ARCH
2 4=0.224480 [0.9239];   
χ
HETR
2  = 1.319861 [0.1047]; JB
N
= 2.659610 [0.2654]; FFF= 0.169034 [0.8446] 
Note: σ is standard error of regression;  χ
SC
2 , χ
ARCH
2  and χ
HETR
2 denote chi-squared statistics to test the null 
hypotheses of no autocorrelation, no autoregressive conditioned heteroscedasticity, and no heteroscedasticity 
(White test) in the residuals; JBN indicate statistics to test the null hypotheses of normal distribution; 
*, **, and *** denote significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; Standard errors for each 
coefficient are in (). Probabilities are in []. 
  Source: Authors’ own compilation 
Estimation results for equation (2) are highly valuable in helping evaluate the 
determining factors for labour supply response to a hypothetical 5% income tax rate 
increase. The coefficient on the gender dummy variable, Female, is negative and significant 
(p<.10). Females are much more sensitive to income tax changes and will reduce their work 
compared to males when faced with an income tax rate increase. These results are in line 
with previous studies that have reported that women are more sensitive than men are  
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to income taxes (Leuthold, 1983; James, 1992; Eissa et al., 2008; Meghir and Phillips,  
2010; Keane, 2011; Saez et al., 2012). Age is also a statistically significant factor  
(" = −.97,  < 0.01). As age increases the motivation to work change of participants,  
on average, decreases significantly. However, if we look at the size of the coefficient,  
it seems to be economically insignificant. A 1% increase in age level decreases the 
motivation to work by only 0.0097 points on average. 
The regression results for marital status are similar to the univariate results. Compared  
to single participants, married subjects’ responses are not statistically significant. However, 
the impact of the tax rate increase is significantly higher for fiancé subjects’ motivation  
to work (" = .71,  < 0.05) compared to married and single subjects. Therefore, the research 
reveals that fiancés are more responsive to income tax rate increases. 
Considering the employment status of the participants, empirical results provide no 
significant differences between academicians, non-professional, and unemployed subjects. 
Note that unemployed subjects also considered taxes more than others in their decision-
making (equation 1), although this difference is not statistically significant.  However,  
non-academic professionals’ labour supply change response is significantly higher  
(" = .47,  < 0.01) and positive. The overall conclusion is that only non-academic 
professionals are highly responsive to income tax rate changes. 
In the labour supply literature, it is quite interesting how the motivation to work changes 
in response to income tax rate increases based on the after-tax wage category (Hausman, 
1985). As shown in the univariate results, we observed a decline in the motivation to work 
as after-tax wages increase. Compared to low income participants, the middle-income 
group’s response is higher, i.e., the coefficient is negative, but it is not statistically 
significant. In the high-income category we observe a negative and statistically significant 
difference (" = −.50,  < 0.01) compared to lower income categories. This means that  
high-income participants are more sensitive to income tax rate increases than low-income 
participants are. 
Conclusion 
Economists primarily use three methodological approaches to studying the relationship 
between income taxes and the motivation to work: surveys of attitudes and perceived 
behaviour, laboratory experiments, and observed labour market behaviour through analysis 
of aggregate data (Atkinson and Stigliz, 2015; Lewis, 1982). Our approach is the study  
of attitude and perceived behaviour, where the most apparent congruence between 
economics and social psychology occurs. Directly questioning individuals about the effect 
of economic policy on their attitudes is unusual and nonstandard in economic fields. 
Therefore, using self-reported answers to tax changes helps us to make a diverse 
contribution to the literature on income taxes and the motivation to work. This research 
strategy allows policymakers to estimate the effects of income tax changes on labour 
markets with different socio-economic characteristics. 
The first test was the extent to which the Azerbaijan population is sensitive to income 
taxes. Only around 35% report taking income taxes into consideration, which shows that the 
majority of the Azerbaijan population is unresponsive to income taxes. The second test 
assesses reactions to a hypothetical income tax rate change. Around 57.8% of the sample 
responded that their motivation to work would not change if income tax rates  
increased by 5%.  
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Using our first research item (perception of income taxes), we find that responses do not 
vary across groups with different socio-economic characteristics such as gender, marital 
status, after-tax wage category, and employment field.  Using the second research item 
(reactions to tax rate changes), we find that significant differences in the strength  
of responses to a hypothetical income tax rate change across gender, age, marital status 
(engaged), employment field (non-academic professionals), and after tax wages  
(high-income only). 
Although this study is small in scale and limited to only two research questions  
and a few social-economic variables, future research can examine additional psychological 
and economic variables such as social services, welfare, attitudes towards work, the value 
placed on leisure time, the number of dependents, households with one instead of two 
working parents, non-labour income, etc. However, we believe that our conclusions have 
several implications for policy and decision-making. One of the strongest ideas is that after 
an income tax is imposed, both the price and utility of leisure are higher for the higher wage 
earners than for low wage earners (on average). Our theory is that as people make more 
money the utility of their leisure time goes up because they can spend the money they make 
to purchase activities with higher utility. Testing with a 5% hypothetical income tax rate 
change, we found that higher wage earners in Azerbaijan will be more sensitive to this 
change and thus they will start to work less. This theory can be tested with the aggregate 
time series evidence (life-cycle models) to see also how tax policy shocks affect the 
motivation to work along with individual’s saving decisions, human capital accumulation, 
and the history dependence in preferences (Keane, 2011). But, the difficulty of collecting 
empirical data on tax behaviour has led scholars to generate their own data with survey 
techniques (Kirchler, 2007). Consequently, using this research method in the future will 
allow us to determine whether increasing income tax rates can be salient in the daily lives  
of workers in Azerbaijan. To the best of our knowledge, little is known about the effect  
of tax rate changes on labourers’ work motivation in poor and rich countries. For this 
reason, future research can test our theory with hypothetical tax rate changes for poor  
and rich countries with different economic and legal systems to see if there is a differences 
between the price and utility of leisure for higher and lower wage earners. Finally, the most 
popular hypothesis about women’s motivation to work (more sensitive to taxation)  
and men’s motivation to work (less sensitive to taxation) is supported by our data  
and empirical results for the Azerbaijan population. 
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